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Abstract—The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT)
necessitates employing privacy-preserving techniques to pro-
tect users’ sensitive information. Even when user traces are
anonymized, statistical matching can be employed to infer sen-
sitive information. In our previous work, we have established
the privacy requirements for the case that the user traces are
instantiations of discrete random variables and the adversary
knows only the structure of the dependency graph, i.e., whether
each pair of users is connected. In this paper, we consider the
case where data traces are instantiations of Gaussian random
variables and the adversary knows not only the structure of
the graph but also the pairwise correlation coefficients. We
establish the requirements on anonymization to thwart such
statistical matching, which demonstrate the significant degree to
which knowledge of the pairwise correlation coefficients further
significantly aids the adversary in breaking user anonymity.
Index Terms—Anonymization, information theoretic privacy,
inter-user dependency, Internet of Things (IoT), Privacy-
Protection Mechanisms (PPM).
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Internet of Things (IoT) enables users to shareand access information on a large scale and provides
many benefits to individuals (e.g., smart homes, healthcare)
and industries (e.g., digital tracking, data collection, disaster
management). However, such benefits are provided by tuning
the system to user characteristics based on potentially sensitive
information about their activities. Thus, the use of IoT comes
with a significant threat to users’ privacy: leakage of sensitive
information.
Two main privacy-preserving techniques are anonymiza-
tion [1]–[3] and obfuscation [4], [5], where the former is
hiding the mapping between data and the users by replacing
the identification fields of users with pseudonyms, and the
latter is perturbing the user data such that the adversary
observes false but plausible data. Although these methods have
been addressed widely, statistical inference methods can be
applied to them to break the privacy of the users [?], [6]–[8].
Furthermore, achieving privacy using these methods comes
with a cost: reducing the utility of the system for the users.
Hence, it is crucial to consider the trade-off between privacy
and utility when employing privacy-preserving techniques, and
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to seek to achieve privacy with minimal loss of functionality
and usability [9]–[11]. Despite the growing interest in IoT
privacy [12], [13], previous works do not offer theoretical
guarantees on the trade-off between privacy and utility. The
works of Shokri et al. [2], [14], [15] and Ma et al. [1]
provide significant advances in the quantitative analyses of
privacy; however, in contrast to these prior works, we take a
foundational approach to understand the theoretical limits.
In [16]–[19], the data traces of different users are modeled
as independent, and the asymptotic limits of user privacy
are presented for the case when both anonymization and
obfuscation are applied to users’ time series of data. In [16],
[17], each user’s data trace is governed by: 1) independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of a Multinoulli distribu-
tion (generalized Bernoulli distribution) with r possibilities for
each data point.; or, 2) Markov chain samples of a Multinoulli
distribution, where each user’s data samples are governed by
a Markov chain with r states. In [18], the case of independent
users with Gaussian traces was addressed. However, the data
traces of different users are dependent in many applications
(e.g,. friends, relatives), and the adversary can potentially
exploit such. In [20], [21], we extended the results of [16],
[17] to the case where users are dependent and the adversary
knows only the structure of the association graph, i.e., whether
each pair of users are linked. As expected, the knowledge of
the dependency graph results in a significant degradation in
privacy [16], [17].
In this paper, we turn our attention to the case where the
trace of each user consists of identically distributed Gaussian
random variables that are independent over time, but there is
dependency between the samples of different users at each
point in time. The adversary knows not just the dependency
graph but also the degree to which the data of different users
are correlated, and thus the adversary knows the joint proba-
bility distribution function (PDF) of the data generated by all
of the users. To preserve the privacy of users, anonymization is
employed, i.e., the mapping between users and data sequences
is randomly permuted for each set of m consequent users’
data. We derive the minimum number m for the adversary’s
observations per user that ensures privacy, with respect to the
number n of users and the size s of the sub-graph to which
the user belongs.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the framework: system model, metrics, and
definitions. Then, we present the construction and analysis
in Section III. In Section IV, we discuss how inter-user
dependency affects system privacy, and in Section V, we
conclude from the results.
II. FRAMEWORK
Consider a system with n users. Denote by Xu(k) the data
point of user u at time k, and by Xu the m×1 vector containing
the data points of user u,
Xu =
[
Xu(1), Xu(2), · · · , Xu(m)
]T
, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
To preserve the privacy of the users, anonymization is
employed, with pseudonyms that are changed every m sam-
ples, i.e., the mapping between users and data sequences is
randomly permuted every m samples. As shown in Figure 1,
denote by Yu(k) the output of the anonymizer, which we term
as the “reported data point” of user u at time k. The permuted
version of Xu is
Yu =
[
Yu(1),Yu(2), · · · ,Yu(m)
]T
, u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n},
The anonymization technique can be modeled by a random
Fig. 1: Applying anonymization to the data point of user u at
time k. Xu(k) denotes the actual data point of user u at time
k, and Yu(k) denotes the reported data point of user u at time
k.
permutation function (Π) on the set of n users. Then, Yu =
XΠ−1(u), YΠ(u) = Xu .
There exists an adversary who wishes to break the
anonymity and thus privacy of the users. He observes
Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yn which are the reported data points of n users at
times 1, 2, . . . ,m, and performs statistical analysis to estimate
the users’ actual data points.
A. Models and Metrics
Data Points Model: Data points are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) with respect to time, i.e., ∀k, k ′ ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m}, k , k ′, Xu(k) is independent of Xu(k ′). At time
k, the vector of user data points is drawn from a multivariate
normal distribution; that is,
[X1(k), X2(k), . . . , Xn(k)] ∼ N
(
µ,Σ
)
,
where µ = [µ1, µ2, . . . , µn] is the mean vector, Σ is the
n × n covariance matrix, Σu,u′ = σ2uu′ = µuu′ − µuµu′ is the
covariance between users u and u′, and the variances of the
user data points are equal for all users (Σu,u′ = σ2). Following
our previous work [21], the parameters of the distribution
governing users’ behavior are in turn drawn randomly. In
particular, we assume the means µ1, µ2, · · · , µn are finite and
Fig. 2: The association graph consists of disjoint subgraphs
(G j), where G j is a connected graph on sj vertices.
are drawn independently from a continuous distribution fµ(x),
where for all x in the support of fµ(x)
0 < δ1 < fµ(x) < δ2 < ∞, (1)
and the correlations µuu′, u = 1, 2, · · · , n, u′ = 1, 2, · · · , n, u ,
u′ are finite, and, when two users are correlated, are drawn
independently from a continuous distribution gµ(x), where for
all x in the support of gµ(x)
0 < δ1 ≤ gµ(x) ≤ δ2 < ∞. (2)
Although it will not affect our results, we note in passing
that the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality shows that σ2 implies an
upper bound on the support of gµ(x).
Association Graph: The dependencies between users are
modeled by an association graph in which two users are
connected if they are dependent. Denote by G(V, E) the
association graph where V is the set of nodes (|V | = n) and E
is the set of edges. Also, denote by ρuu′ =
µuu′−µuµu′
σ2
the cor-
relation coefficient between users u and u′. Observe (u, u′) ∈
E iff ρuu′ , 0. Similar to [21], the association graph consists
of disjoint subgraphs G1(V1, E1),G2(V2, E2), . . . ,G f (Vf , E f ),
where each subgraph G j is connected and refers to a group of
“friends” or “associates.” Let sj denotes the number of nodes
in G j(Vj, Ej), i.e., sj = |Vj |.
Adversary Model: The adversary knows the multivariate
normal distribution from which the data points of users are
drawn. Therefore, in contrast to [21], the adversary knows
both the structure of the association graph G(V, E) as well
as the correlation coefficients (ρuu′) for each pair of users
(u, u′) ∈ E . The adversary also knows the anonymization
mechanism; however, they don’t not know the realization of
the random permutation function.
The situation in which the user has no privacy is defined as
follows [16]:
Definition 1. User u has no privacy at time k, if and only if
there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate Xu(k)
perfectly as n goes to infinity. In other words, as n→∞,
∀k ∈ N, Pe(u) , P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) → 0,
where Xu(k) is the estimated value of Xu(k) by the adversary.
III. IMPACT OF DEPENDENCY ON PRIVACY USING
ANONYMIZATION
Here, we consider to what extent inter-user dependency
limits privacy in the case users’ data points are governed by
a Gaussian distribution.
The adversary knows the structure of the statistical de-
pendency and seeks to use it to match users to their data
sequences. First, the adversary must figure out the dependency
in the data traces. Thus, we consider the ability of the
adversary to fully reconstruct the structure of the association
graph of the anonymized version of the data with arbitrarily
small error probability.
Lemma 1. If for any λ > 0, the adversary obtains m = nλ
anonymized observations, they can reconstruct G˜ = G˜(V˜, E˜),
where V˜ = {Π(u) : u ∈ V} = V, such that with high
probability, for all u, u′ ∈ V; (u, u′) ∈ E iff (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ E˜ .
We write this statement as P(E˜ = E) → 1.
Proof. From the observations, the adversary can calculate the
empirical covariance for each pair of user u and user u′,Covuu′ = Suu′m − Sum Su′m , (3)
where
Su =
m∑
k=1
Xu(k), Suu′ =
m∑
k=1
Xu(k)Xu′(k). (4)
We claim for m = nλ, and large enough n,
• |Covuu′ | ≤ m− 15 , iff (u, u′) < E˜,
• |Covuu′ | > m− 15 , iff (u, u′) ∈ E˜,
In other words, we show P(E˜ = E) → 1 as n→∞.
Now, define
Juu′ =
{ Covuu′ − (µuu′ − µuµu′ )  ≥ 2θ};
thus, we have
P (Juu′) = P
( ( Suu′m − µuu′) − ( Sum Su′m − µuµu′)  ≥ 2θ
)
≤ P
(Suu′m − µuu′  + Sum Su′m − µuµu′  ≥ 2θ)
≤ P
({Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ θ} ⋃ {Sum Su′m − µuµu′  ≥ θ}
)
≤ P
(Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ θ) + P (Sum Su′m − µuµu′  ≥ θ) , (5)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that |a − b| ≤
|a| + |b|, and as a result, P ( |a − b| ≥ 2θ) ≤ P ( |a| + |b| ≥ 2θ) .
The union bound yields the third inequality.
Note that we have
P
(Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ θ) ≤ E
[(∑m
k=1
(
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
) )ζ ]
θζmζ
,
≤
τE
[(∑m
k=1
(
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)2)ζ/2]
θζmζ
,
≤
τE
[(∑m
k=1(Xu (k)Xu′ (k)−µuu′)2
m
)ζ/2]
θζmζ/2
, (6)
where the first and second steps follow from Cheby-
shev’s inequality and the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund inequal-
ity [22], respectively, and τ > 0 is a constant indepen-
dent of m. Note that the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund requires
E[(Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′ )ζ ] < +∞ which follows from the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that the ζ th moments
of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) are finite.
Consider the right-hand side (RHS) of (6). Since f (x) =
xζ/2 is a convex function of x when x > 0, Jensen’s inequality
yields:
©­­­­«
m∑
k=1
(
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)2
m
ª®®®®¬
ζ/2
≤
m∑
k=1
(
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ
m
.
Consequently, (6) yields:
P
(Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ θ) ≤
τE

m∑
k=1
(Xu (k)Xu′ (k)−µuu′)ζ
m

θζmζ/2
=
τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ]
θζmζ/2
. (7)
Note that E
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ] on the RHS of (7) is finite
for 0 ≤ ζ < ∞, following from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
and the fact that the ζ th moments of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) are
finite.
Also, since Sum − µ has a zero-mean normal distribution with
a variance equal to σ
2
m , we have
P
(Sum − µu  ≥ θ) = 1 − erf
(√
mθ√
2σ
)
≤ e−mθ
2
2σ2 , (8)
where the last step is true because erf(x) ≥ 1 − e−x2 . Now, if
θ → 0, we have
P
(Sum Su′m − µuµu′  ≥ θ) =
= P
(Sum − µu  ≥ θ ′) P (Su′m − µu′  ≥ θ ′)
=
©­«1 − erf
(√
mθ ′√
2σ
)ª®¬
2
≤ e−mθ
′2
σ2 , (9)
where θ ′ = θµu+µ′u .
Let m = nλ, θ = m−
1
4 , and ζ = d 8λ e. By (5), (7), and (9),
the union bound yields
P
©­«
n⋃
u=1
n⋃
u′=1
Juu′ª®¬
≤
τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)2s(s+1)]
n2
(
n
λ
4
) d 8λ e + n2e 1(µu+µu′ )2σ2 n− λ2 ,
as a result, we can conclude as n→∞,
P
©­«
n⋃
u=1
n⋃
u′=1
Juu′ª®¬→ 0.
Now, we can conclude with high probability, for all (u, u′) <
E (which means ρuu′ = 0),
|Covuu′ | ≤ m− 15 ,
as n → ∞. On the other hand, with high probability, for all
(u, u′) ∈ E (which means µuu′ − µuµu′ , 0),
|Covuu′ | ≥ m− 15 ,
as n → ∞. Consequently, the adversary can reconstruct the
association graph of the anonymized version of the data with
arbitrarily small error probability. 
Next, we demonstrate how the adversary can identify group
1 among all of the groups. Note that this is the key step which
speeds up the adversary’s algorithm relative to the case where
user traces are independent.
Lemma 2. If for any α > 0, the adversary obtains m =
n
4
s(s+1)+α anonymized observations and knows the structure of
the association graph, they can identify group 1 among all of
the groups with arbitrarily small error probability.
Proof. Note that there are at most ns groups of size s which
we denote 1, 2, · · · , ns . Without loss of generality, we assume
the members of group 1 are users {1, 2, · · · , s}.
By (4), for all members of group 1 (u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}), the
empirical mean µΠ(u) is:
µΠ(u) = Sum . (10)
For i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}, define vectors P∗i and P˜∗i with length s−i:
P∗i = [µ(i)(i+1), µ(i)(i+2), · · · , µ(i)(s)],
P˜∗i = [µ(i)(i+1),µ(i)(i+2), · · · , µ(i)(s)],
and for i = 0, define
P∗0 = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µs], P˜∗0 = [µ˜1, µ˜2, · · · , µ˜s].
Also, define arrays P(1), P˜(1) ∈ R s(s+1)2 as:
P(1) = [P∗0,P∗1, · · · ,P∗s], P˜(1) = [P˜∗0, P˜∗1, · · · , P˜∗s].
Let Πs be the set of all permutations on s elements; for pis ∈
Πs , pis : {1, 2, · · · , s} → {1, 2, · · · , s} is a one-to-one mapping.
From [21, Equation 6], define
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
)
= min
pis ∈Πs
{
| |P(1) − P˜(1)pis | |∞
}
. (11)
Next, we show when m = cn
4
s(s+1)+α and n→∞,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
• P ©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬→ 0 ,
where ∆n = n
− 2
s(s+1)− α4 .
First, we prove D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
)
≤ ∆n with high probability.
Substituting θ = ∆n in (7) and (8) yields:
P
(Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ ∆n) ≤ τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ]
∆
ζ
nmζ/2
= τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ] n− α4 ζ,
(12)
and
P
(Sum − µu  ≥ ∆n) ≤ e−m∆2n2σ2 = e− 12σ2 n α2 . (13)
By the union bound,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
P
(Sum − µu  ≥ ∆n) + s∑
u=1
s∑
u′=u+1
P
(Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ ∆n)
= sP
(Sum − µu  ≥ ∆n) + s(s − 1)2 P (Suu′m − µuu′  ≥ ∆n)
≤ se− 12σ2 n
α
2
+
s(s − 1)
2
τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ] n− α4 ζ,
consequently, as n→∞,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1.
Next, we show
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®®¬→ 0.
Note that by (1) and (2), for all groups other than group 1,
P
(P(1) − P(l) ≤ 2∆n) ≤ (4∆n) s(s+1)2 δ2
≤ δ24
s(s+1)
2 n−1−
αs(s+1)
8 .
Similarly, for any pis ∈ Πs ,
P
(P(1) − P(l)pis  ≤ 2∆n) ≤ δ24 s(s+1)2 n−1− αs(s+1)8 .
Thus, as n→∞, the union bound yields:
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
l=2

⋃
pis ∈Πs
{P(1) − P(l)pis  ≤ 2∆n}
ª®®¬ ≤
n
s
s!δ24
s(s+1)
2 n−1−
αs(s+1)
8
= (s − 1)!4 s(s+1)2 n− αs(s+1)8 → 0.
Thus, with high probability, the distance between each of
the P(l)’s and P(1) is larger than 2∆n. Next, we show that, with
high probability, each of the P˜(l)’s is significantly close to P(l).
By using the union bound with (12) and (13), for ζ > d 4α e,
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
)
≥ ∆n
}ª®®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ ne− 12σ2 n
α
2
+
s − 1
2
τE
[ (
Xu(k)Xu′(k) − µuu′
)ζ ] n1− α4 ζ → 0,
as n→∞.
Consequently, for all l = 2, 3, · · · , ns , P˜(l)’s are close to
P(l)’s; thus, for large enough n,
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®®¬→ 0.
Hence, the adversary can successfully identify group 1 among
all of the groups with arbitrarily small error probability. 
Finally, we show that the adversary can identify all of the
members of group 1 with arbitrarily small error probability.
Lemma 3. If for any α > 0, the adversary obtains m =
n
4
s(s+1)+α anonymized observations, and group 1 is identified
among all the groups, the adversary can identify user 1 with
arbitrarily small error probability.
Proof. Define sets B(n) and C(n) around µ1:
B(n) = {x ∈ (0, 1); |x − µ1 | ≤ ∆n} ,
C(n) = {x ∈ (0, 1); |x − µ1 | ≤ 2∆n} ,
where ∆n = n
− 2
s(s+1)− α4 .
Next, we show that when m = cn
4
s(s+1)+α and n→∞,
• P
( S1
m − µ1
 ≤ ∆n) → 1.
• P
(
s⋃
u=2
{ Su
m − µ1
 ≤ ∆n}) → 0.
In other words, the adversary examines µ˜u’s which are defined
according to (10) and chooses the only one that belongs to
B(n).
Substituting θ = ∆n in (8) yields:
P
(S1
m
− µ1
 ≤ ∆n) ≥ 1 − e−m∆2n2σ2
= 1 − e− 12σ2 n
α
2 → 1.
Thus, for large enough n,
P
(µΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1.
Next, we show that when n→∞,
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{Su
m
− µ1
 ≤ ∆n}ª®¬→ 0.
By (1),
P
(
µu ∈ C(n)
)
< 4∆nδ2.
Therefore, the union bound yields:
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{
µu ∈ C(n)
}ª®¬ ≤
s∑
u=2
P
(
µu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4s∆nδ2
≤ 4sn− 2s(s+1)− α4 δ2 → 0.
Consequently, all µu’s are outside of C(n) with high probabil-
ity. Next, we prove P
(µΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) is small. Observe:
P
(Su
m
− µ1
 ≤ ∆n) = P (Sum − µu  ≥ ∆n)
≤ e−
m∆2n
2σ2 = e−
1
2σ2
n
α
2 ;
hence, by the union bound, when n is large enough,
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{Su
m
− µ1
 ≤ ∆n}ª®¬ ≤ se−
1
2σ2
n
α
2 → 0.
Thus, if m = n
4
s(s+1)+α, there exists an algorithm for the adver-
sary to successfully identify user 1 among all the users. 
Next, we present Theorem 1 which follows from Lem-
mas 1, 2, and 3. In this theorem, we determine the required
number of observations per user (m) for the adversary to break
the privacy of each user, in terms of the number of users (n)
and size of group to which the user of interest belongs (s).
Theorem 1. If the adversary knows both the structure of the
association graph and the correlation coefficient between users,
and m = cn
4
s(s+1)+α, for any α > 0; then, user 1 has no privacy
at time k.
Lastly, in Theorem 2, we consider the case where the ad-
versary knows only the association graph, but not necessarily
the correlation coefficients between the users. Similar to the
arguments leading to Theorem 1 and [21, Theorem 1] we show
that if m is significantly larger than n
2
s , then the adversary can
successfully break the privacy of the user of interest, i.e., the
adversary can find an algorithm to estimate the actual data
points of the user with vanishing small error probability.
Theorem 2. If the adversary knows the structure of the
association graph, and m = cn
2
s +α
′
, for any α′ > 0; then,
user 1 has no privacy at time k.
IV. DISCUSSION
Here, we compare our results with previous work. When
the users are independent, the adversary can break the privacy
of each user if the number of the adversary’s observations
per user is m = n2 [18] (Case 1 in Figure 3). However,
when the users are dependent, and the adversary knows their
association graph (and not the correlation coefficients), each
user will have no privacy if m = n
2
s (Theorem 2: Case 2 in
Figure 3). The required number of per-user observations for
the adversary to break the privacy of each user reduces further
Fig. 3: Comparing the required number of observations per
user for the adversary to break the privacy of each user
for three cases: 1) independent users; 2) dependent users,
adversary knows only the association graph; 3) dependent
users, the adversary knows both the association graph and the
correlation coefficient between users.
(m = n
4
s(s+1) ) when the adversary has more information: the
correlation coefficients between users (Theorem 1: Case 3 in
Figure 3). In other words, the more the adversary knows, the
smaller m must be. Note that smaller m means rapid changes in
pseudonyms, which reduces the utility. We have characterized
the significance in the loss of privacy of various degrees of
knowledge of user dependencies in this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
Many popular applications use traces of user data, e.g.,
users’ location information or medical records, to offer various
services to the users. However, revealing user information to
such applications put users’ privacy at stake, as adversaries
can infer sensitive private information about the users such
as their behaviors, interests, and locations. In this paper,
anonymization is employed to protect users’ privacy when data
traces of each user observed by the adversary are governed by
i.i.d. Gaussian sequences, and data traces of different users
are dependent. An association graph is employed to show
the dependency between users, and both the structure of this
association graph and the nature of the dependency between
users are known to the adversary. We show that dependency is
a significant detriment to the privacy of users. In comparison to
the case in which data traces of different users are independent,
here we must use a stronger anonymization technique by
drastically increasing the rate at which user pseudonyms are
changed, which degrades system utility.
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